
Marine Corps Public Affairs



U.S. Marine Corps

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
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FOREWORD

“The future success of the Marine Corps depends on two factors: first, an efficient performance of all duties to which its officers and men may be assigned; second, promptly bringing the efficiency to the attention of the proper officials of the Government, and the American people.”¹

—Major General John A. Lejeune,
USMC, 13th Commandant

The two most important things the Marine Corps does for the Nation are to make Marines and to win battles. Public affairs has become an integral part of warfighting and heightens an existing, indispensable bond between the Marine Corps and the American public. Sophistication in public affairs is just as important as tactics and weapons training considering the fierce competition among the news media, and technology that provides real-time live coverage anywhere in the world. Every Marine is now a potential spokesperson and must be educated in the fundamentals of dealing with the news media. How Marines respond to news media queries and how we help news media representatives get the story reported can be critical to the way the Marine Corps is perceived by America.

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.3, *Marine Corps Public Affairs*, describes the Marine Corps’ doctrine on public affairs. Although it is particularly relevant for Marine air-ground

task force (MAGTF) commanders and their staffs, it is important for every Marine to understand the information contained herein.

MCWP 3-33.3 examines—

- | The information environment.
- | The news media.
- | Policies and principles.
- | Command responsibility.

By investigating these areas, MCWP 3-33.3 provides the requisite information needed by commanders and their staffs to understand public affairs.

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

J.E. RHODES
Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding General
Marine Corps Combat Development Command

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Chapter 1

Public Affairs and the Information Environment

“I learn more from CNN than I do from the CIA.”²

—Former President George Bush,
on the impact of the media,
during Operation DESERT STORM

“Today, information management is as important as maneuver and fires, from the psychological-operations campaign you conduct to the way you handle the media. And it isn’t just the U.S. media, with their impact on public opinion and inside-the-beltway decision making.”³

—Lieutenant General Anthony Zinni
USMC, following Operation
RESTORE HOPE

Information flow is the catalyst for accountability in our society, and public affairs is the function within the Marine Corps that keeps the American people informed during conflict as well as during peacetime.

The way the battles are fought in the 21st century presents new challenges to Marines. One of the major challenges is where we will fight those battles, including urban and littoral warfare. In addition, challenges that may or may not involve combat must also be considered such as the humanitarian missions: i.e., peace-keeping, peace enforcement, rescue and evacuation, and disaster relief.

Within the context of these new challenges, public affairs (PA) is not merely an adjunct activity. In peacetime, public affairs provides Marines and the general public with information that increases public understanding of the Marine Corps' roles and missions, which is crucial to the future of the Corps. Public affairs has also become one of the central elements of tactical, operational, and strategic planning and execution. We can no longer conduct mission planning without involving public affairs.

Public affairs efforts can have positive as well as negative impacts in the battlespace, and these actions can have possible decisive effects on the operational mission. Public affairs also provides the mechanism through which Marines and the American public can understand the status of the five pillars on which the future of the Marine Corps rests: warfighting, people, core values, education, and training. Simply phrased, public affairs is tasked to tell the Marine Corps story.

Effective public affairs operations are becoming more difficult at the same time that they are becoming increasingly important. The public affairs mandate is to get the word out effectively,

efficiently, and honestly. This is complex because the environment is so dynamic, and the all-important specific details are elusive.

Marine Corps policy is to tell the truth as quickly as possible. That includes good news as well as bad. Public affairs is the discipline of communication that informs and educates. It is *not* designed to influence. Public affairs personnel often must work to separate public affairs from other informational efforts aimed at manipulating perceptions. Any deviation from the truth will destroy the credibility and effectiveness of Marine Corps public affairs operations and will negatively affect the institution.

Marines accomplish the public affairs mission by making public affairs an equal partner in planning and operations. We recognize that PA must be included in the Marine Corps Planning Process in order to influence planning at the appropriate time and place, whether in the operational planning team or in the crisis action team. We make certain the public affairs officer (PAO) is in the loop at all times and at all levels of our missions. Our communication process—both internal and external—constantly needs tuning. A detailed public affairs plan is an essential feature of operation plans and orders.

MISSION

The mission of public affairs is to provide timely, accurate information to Marines and the general public and to initiate and support activities contributing to good relations between the Marine Corps and the public.

The Marine Corps must make a clear and compelling statement of its mission and provide the American people with the information

that will allow them to understand that Marine Corps' readiness is essential to national security.

Marine Corps public affairs is a communication discipline that informs and educates people about the missions, organization, capabilities, needs, activities, and performance of the Marine Corps as an instrument of national defense policy and security. Because the Marine Corps is part of the national military establishment, it belongs to the American people. It is also a unique institution as described in Title 10 of the *United States Code*. Therefore, the Marine Corps has special responsibilities to keep the American public informed. It does that through the news media in the form of press conferences, interviews, editorial boards, public speaking, and articles. The free press is one of many freedoms we believe in and defend. At peace or at war, the news media and the public are entitled to timely, accurate responses from the Marine Corps whenever such responses are warranted. How we respond to that mandate reflects directly on our personal and institutional integrity. Our policy is clear: honesty, openness, and accessibility to the maximum extent possible.

Another aim of public affairs is to maintain positive relations between the individual Marine Corps command and its personnel with the citizens of the surrounding community. Many Marines and their families live offbase and make a lasting contribution to the image of the Marine Corps in America's neighborhoods. The morale and esprit de corps of those men and women are influenced by the attitudes of the civilian community toward their mission and presence in the region. Good relations between Marines living and traveling offbase and the civilians in the surrounding community serve as avenues for information sharing and problemsolving. They also foster favorable opinions of the Marine Corps and the Department of Defense (DOD) in general. By being involved in a range of command-related activities, the

public gains a better understanding of a ready Marine Corps, the contribution of the local command in fulfilling the national defense strategy, and the interest of command leadership in its stewardship of taxpayer resources.

One of the most important aspects of public affairs is providing pertinent information to Marines, their families and dependents, the Marine Corps Reserve, retired Marines, and civilian employees. Timely, accurate information—

- 1 Displaces rumors that can be detrimental to morale.
- 1 Enhances the quality of life.
- 1 Fosters positive lifestyles.
- 1 Provides career-related information.
- 1 Increases personnel readiness.

This information is provided through a number of news media outlets, including base newspapers, local cable television, the Armed Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS), official Internet and intranet websites, and Marine Corps-printed publications. Additional outlets available to public affairs for providing information to the Marine Corps family are Marine Corps key volunteers, family service centers, officer and enlisted clubs, telephone trees, and a hotline with recorded information.

The functions of public affairs apply during peace as well as war. Whether the Marine Corps is involved in a humanitarian effort, a peacekeeping operation, a major regional contingency, or collecting toys for tots, public affairs plays a critical role in the military information environment. Although the public affairs' mission is to inform, an important product of an effective public affairs

program is an enhanced public understanding of Marine Corps' missions, capabilities, and roles in the national defense.

THE GLOBAL INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

The Marine Corps public affairs' main product is information, therefore, the information environment within which it operates must be understood. The concept of information operations describes the impact of information in a broad context that permeates the full range of military operations from peace to global war. Information operations are actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's information and information systems. Units conduct information operations across the full range of military operations—from operations in garrison, during deployment and combat operations, and continuing through redeployment upon mission completion. This blurs the boundaries between the military information environment and the global information environment at an increasing rate, making effective information operations planning more complex and difficult.

THE ROLE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS IN THE MILITARY INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

In the military information environment, there are interrelated components: operations, information systems, and relevant information and intelligence. Command and control warfare (C2W), civil affairs (CA), and public affairs fall within the operations component. They are used to gain information dominance partly through the use of informational instruments. Psychological operations (PSYOP) is the informational instrument employed by

C2W operations and is used, with other C2W functions, to influence, deny information to, degrade, or destroy adversary command and control (C2) capabilities while protecting one's capabilities. CA also employs an information function that provides a commander with the means to convey information to critical actors in the area of operations as well as the ability to obtain crucial intelligence from the local population. The following paragraphs discuss differences between public affairs and the other informational instruments.

Psychological Operations

Psychological operations are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to *influence* their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately, the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. A major element of PSYOP is propaganda, which is any form of communication in support of national objectives designed to *influence* the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor either directly or indirectly. Note that the objective of propaganda is to *influence* people. PSYOP's main objective is to minimize the effects of an adversary's hostile propaganda and disinformation campaign against United States (U.S.) forces. Discrediting adversary propaganda or disinformation against the operations of U.S. and/or coalition forces is critical to maintaining favorable public opinion.

Civil Affairs

CA activities encompass the relationship between military forces, civil authorities, and people in a friendly or foreign country or area. CA activities support national policy and implement U.S.

national objectives by coordinating with, *influencing*, developing, or controlling indigenous infrastructures in operational areas. CA secures local acceptance of and support for U.S. forces. CA is important for gaining information dominance because of its ability to interface with key organizations and individuals in the global information environment (e.g., CA's traditional relationship with nongovernmental organizations [NGOs] and private voluntary organizations [PVOs] such as the International Committee of the Red Cross). CA personnel have many talents and skills to add to civil-military operations (CMO) and should provide input during all information operations.

PSYOP and Civil Affairs

Public affairs differs from PSYOP and CA in two important ways. First, the major function of public affairs is to *inform* and *educate* the target audience whether it is within the Marine Corps family or part of the general public. Herein lies the major difference between CA, PSYOP, and public affairs. Where the intent of PSYOP and CA is to *influence* the target audience, the intent of public affairs is only to *inform* and educate. Although public affairs does influence people, any such influence is a by-product—the result or effect of people being informed—rather than the design or intent of the communication. Second, PSYOP and CA involve forms of communication directed primarily at foreign audiences. Public affairs may involve communication directed at either foreign or domestic audiences, or both.

Civil-Military Operations

Military operations that involve contact with civilians and are designed to coordinate, influence, control, or develop civil organizations are classified as CMO. In an expeditionary setting,

relationships with local populations in each commander's area of operations (AO) are a CA function, not a public affairs function.

Community relations, in contrast, is a functional application of public affairs. Community relations (ComRel) refers to an array of activities that place Marine Corps personnel and hardware in direct contact with the public around or near home bases or stations. ComRel programs are routinely conducted in a garrison setting, often in support of local celebrations, commemorations or other public events, although they may also be conducted in an operational or exercise setting. Community relations activities are routinely established and coordinated by non-PA personnel: Sergeants Major, Chaplains, Morale, Welfare and Recreation efforts, and others. To maximize the benefits of such efforts, public affairs should be involved in the planning of such events.

Public affairs is a special staff function. CA is a functional area under the J-5/G-5/S-3. PSYOP is a functional area under the cognizance of the J-3/G-3/S-3 or the Joint PSYOP Task Force (JPOTF) Commander, if one exists. Coordination and staff interaction between CA, PSYOP, and public affairs elements are required to ensure that the activities of one staff element do not conflict with or complicate the work of another. In an expeditionary setting, both public affairs and CMO personnel may disseminate information to local populations. However, *public affairs elements have the responsibility to deal with media outlets*. They will assist CMO elements in passing CA information to the public through the appropriate media outlets. CMO involving PSYOP may use message channels that are not used by public affairs, such as mobile loudspeakers or leaflets to disseminate their message.

Other Informational Activities

Other forms of communication that are sometimes confused with public affairs and may conflict with or complicate its work are marketing, public relations, and advertising. These disciplines are often more closely associated with the economic rather than the informational instrument of national security strategy. The only consistently identifiable and legally mandated dividing line between public affairs and other aspects of the informational instrument is the design or intent of the communication.

Marketing assumes that the key task of the organization is to determine the needs and wants of target markets. Marketers seek to adapt the organization to satisfy those wants and needs more effectively and efficiently than their competitors. The Marine Corps, through the Advertising Branch of the Marine Corps Recruiting Command, is authorized by Congress to conduct domestic advertising, but only as a personnel procurement function.

Public relations has many definitions. It most often refers to non-paid communications designed to influence various publics through the media by disseminating favorable news—building an image—to earn public understanding and goodwill.

Advertising is defined as any paid form of nonpersonal presentation of ideas, goods, or services by an identified sponsor.

In operations separate and distinct from those of the Division of Public Affairs, the Morale, Welfare, and Recreation Division of Headquarters, Marine Corps (HQMC) conducts authorized operations in each of these three other disciplines.

To maintain credibility and articulate policy, public affairs must remain—consistently and unambiguously, at war and at peace, at home and abroad—a form of communication designed to inform and educate people. Accordingly, public affairs does not include marketing, public relations, or advertising. To maintain credibility and uphold policy, public affairs must be strictly regarded and employed as a means to provide information, not to influence.

Chapter 2

The News Media

“I have found that the media I have worked with—by and large at higher percentages than found in most professions—are truly professional and can be trusted and work well when you start off on the right foot together We worked in a cooperative manner; we didn't get crossways with each other, and we didn't find ourselves having friction points.”⁴

—Lieutenant General Anthony Zinni, USMC

The working relationship between the Marine Corps and the news media should be a professional one. We live in an age of exploding information technology, where live coverage of events is the norm and where an ever-increasing appetite for news and information challenges commanding officers and their staffs as never before. The news media's coverage of the Marine Corps and its missions must be permitted, supported, and planned for at all levels. We must be prepared to meet, brief, transport, escort, and live with media personnel to provide an atmosphere for accurate and timely coverage. Individual Marines represent the Marine Corps well to the public and must be prepared for opportunities to tell its story. To do this, Marines must understand the role of the media, what drives it, and the way it functions.

THE CHANGING WORLD OF THE NEWS MEDIA

During World War II, only a handful of correspondents covered Marines in the Pacific campaign. The correspondents used portable typewriters and had to file their stories by mail. Their stories first had to pass the scrutiny of censors. Often, weeks passed before the censored copy reached the news organization that ran it. Action film shot by combat camera crews was carefully screened before it was shown in movie theaters. The public saw little bloodshed. The captured, dead, and wounded consisted mostly of enemy personnel. During the early days of the Korean war, such rules and military censorship were not in place. Nonetheless, because of furious competition, particularly between the wire services, reporters asked General MacArthur to intervene. He did so by imposing a code of conduct and censorship. If a correspondent violated the code, he was sent packing.

During the Vietnam war, on the other hand, coverage was not censored. Coverage of the firefights and frustrations of that conflict appeared in American living rooms within days. For the first time, Americans watching the evening news on television saw young Americans coming home in body bags. That shocking revelation of the true nature of war drew tremendous public attention to the handling of every facet of the war effort. Unfortunately, the response of many military personnel to what they saw as unwarranted news media intrusiveness was defensive, evasive, and sometimes dishonest. These attitudes did not sit well with the American public and led to a damaging distrust of the military.

One of the legacies of the Vietnam war was a perception by military leaders that an unencumbered news media helped inflame civilian opinion and contributed to the antiwar—perceived as anti-military—movement. A survey—done for the Frank Aukofer and William Lawrence book *America's Team, The Odd Couple, A Report on the Relationship Between the Media and the Military*—showed that 64 percent of military officers surveyed strongly or somewhat agreed that news coverage of the events in Vietnam harmed the war effort. Other publications have focused on the seeds of distrust sown in Vietnam between the military and the news media.

When the Allies landed on France in the Normandy invasion of 1944, fewer than 30 reporters were with them. By comparison, more than 500 journalists and technicians were on the scene within hours of the beginning of combat operations in both Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989. In 1991, more than 1,600 members of the news media gathered in the Persian Gulf to cover the war against Iraq. By then, typewriters had given way to laptop computers, minicams, digital tape recorders, and satellite phones. Coverage was live from anywhere around the globe. Additionally, the advent of 24-hour news networks brought about a need

for news reports to fill broadcasts and led to increased competition for stories.

The new reality is that the news media will be with Marines on deployments. The word will get out immediately because live coverage is now the norm. As we learned in Somalia in 1993, reporters and news crews will sometimes be on the scene even before the Marines land. In this case, news media coverage was a deliberate part of military planning with the intent of sending a message to the Somali warlords. Although this event was planned at higher headquarters, the first Marines who came ashore in Mogadishu were met by the news media and were temporarily blinded by the camera lights. The news media presence affected the way Marines did their jobs and reinforced the value of including public affairs in the planning process. The plan also needs to be thoroughly briefed to all Marines to prepare them for surprises. Because of the forward presence of the news media, what used to be tactical- or operational-level situations can now quickly escalate and affect decisions at the strategic or national level.

The intensity of the press-military relationship will not wane in the future. There have been, are, and will continue to be imperfections on both sides. Nonetheless, withholding information, minus valid operational security concerns, is not an option. The Marine Corps needs the news media to tell its story because it generally does things that the public would support if it were informed. The Marine Corps exists today because America wants a Marine Corps—that is, the spirit, values, and capabilities the Marine Corps represents. Without support from the public, the Marine Corps would cease to exist. Congress legislated the Marine Corps into existence and can just as easily abolish it. The public does not blindly give its support, but expects and deserves to know who its Marines are, what they do, and how they do it.

Active public affairs programs are the best way to provide this information. Although the intent of public affairs cannot be to influence public opinion for the Marine Corps' benefit, increased public support is a predictable outcome of a comprehensive public affairs program that shows the public who Marines really are and what they really do.

NEWS MEDIA CONCERNS

Because of intense competition and ever-improving technology, the desire of news media to cover most operations will continue to be high. Combat always attracts large numbers of media. Not only is it a ratings race between various news media outlets, it is also a fertile environment for news media personnel to build their reputations. A lot of current news media stars became famous covering firefights in Vietnam and battles during the Persian Gulf war.

The news media believe that the free press is just as necessary to the maintenance of American freedoms as the military. The main objective of the news media is to produce unbiased, undistorted coverage of significant, newsworthy events. The news media face challenges similar in many ways to those Marines face. It is in the best interest for the news media to protect their credibility by producing honest, well-founded stories. Their professional reputation is only as good as their last news piece, yet they must often produce against a very tight deadline. When they are at odds against a military system that wants to be precise and correct (and sometimes operationally secure) before it releases information, they may go to other sources for information about their story. In these cases, it is usually in the military's best interest to get the information and get it out so someone with contrary interests does

not set the story wrong. Because once a story is set wrong, it is very difficult to correct it later with the facts.

Like Marines, reporters learn to adapt and overcome obstacles. When a news agency sends a reporter on site, it expects a report on something—if not the original topic, then something else. Modern journalism relies on the same technology the Marine Corps employs: computers, satellites, and the Internet. Like good Marines, good reporters will prevail even when technology fails.

To accomplish their mission, news media members certainly do not expect censorship, and they desire to be allowed to visit anywhere they choose. News media representatives prefer not to be managed or controlled. They believe that the real story lies beyond any interference or guidance from the establishment.

And yet, at the same time that the news media expect less monitoring, fewer and fewer reporters, producers, bureau chiefs, technicians, or other media personnel have military service experience. As a result, unless they have covered the military on a full-time or near-full-time basis, they may have little knowledge of the military profession. Reporters who lack experience with the military may not be familiar with warfighting tenets or weapons systems. They may have outdated or anecdotal notions—some positive, some negative—about military personnel, culture, and objectives. They may have no idea what a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) is or what it does, nor the difference between littoral or urban warfare.

The news media's desire to be unfettered while performing its mission often contradicts the objectives of military leaders. PAOs who understand and appreciate the challenges facing the modern news media will be better able to advise and provide counsel to commanders. A successful PAO recognizes the necessity of

understanding how the news media works and the differences among and within the various news organizations.

Getting the word out accurately requires knowing who is asking and what kind of answer they want. Daily and weekly publications such as the *Washington Post*, *New York Times*, *Newsweek*, *Time*, and *U.S. News and World Report* do longer, in-depth pieces. So do many television (TV) magazine shows such as 20/20 and 60 Minutes. Their deadlines are usually not as tight as those of radio and TV news shows, including cable, but they require detailed information, and their reporters tend to be more knowledgeable about the military. Radio (particularly all-news format stations) and the TV cable news organizations have an insatiable appetite and continual need for news updates. They need the facts, and they need them often.

In an operational environment, PAOs must therefore conduct more than just a once-a-day news briefing—they need to arrange multiple interviews, perhaps at different locations, for reporters and camera crews. Radio and TV news reporters file their stories more often and usually file shorter pieces (20 seconds to 3 minutes on the average). Cable news operations have ratcheted up the competition to the point where the requirement for news and information is now 24 hours a day and creates a demand for detailed information even on slow news days. The broadcast networks and stations are increasing their coverage to keep pace. Satellite links are more readily available so many local TV stations now send their own reporters to the scene, thus diminishing the stations' need for network coverage, but adding to the level of

effort for PAOs. This trend was prevalent during Desert Storm and will become more and more prevalent.

GUIDELINES

In response to many problems experienced in providing news coverage of combat during Desert Storm, a detailed analysis was conducted by the DOD. This analysis resulted in guidelines for coverage of DOD combat operations discussed in the following paragraphs.

Open and independent reporting will be the principal means of coverage of U.S. military operations. Commanders should expect regular encounters with journalists who will show up in their assigned areas of responsibility and joint operations areas. Some of these reporters will be registered by the joint force and will carry identifying credentials issued by the PAO, and others will merely appear and begin coverage. Journalists not credentialed by DOD may not necessarily be given the same access as those who have credentials. In many cases, the journalists may not be accompanied by trained public affairs personnel.

The news media recognizes that there are times when a remote location and/or operational considerations will limit access. In these cases, the news media must operate in a pool. (See appendix A, DOD National News Media Pool Support.) A news media pool requires reporters to combine their coverage and make their stories available to all. Ideally, pools should represent the entire news media spectrum. The news media does not like pools. Further, the deployment of a pool does not guarantee that no other journalists will be encountered.

Even under conditions of open coverage, pools may be appropriate for specific events, such as those at extremely remote locations or where space is limited.

Pools are not to serve as the standard means of covering U.S. military operations; however, pools may sometimes provide the only feasible means of early access to a military operation. Pools should be as large as possible and be disbanded at the earliest opportunity—within 24 to 36 hours when possible. The arrival of early-access pools will not cancel the principle of independent coverage for journalists already in the area.

The news media is competitive by nature, and pools minimize competition. The news media must publish or perish, and the publication of an exclusive story today is an insurance policy against being scooped by a competitor tomorrow. Pools will stay together only as long as there is something for the news media to gain. When there is less to gain from being in a pool than there is from operating independently, members of the news media will desert the pool en masse. Although the commander, through the PAO, determines how many news media members go and how they get there, the news media actually decide who goes and how distribution of the pool product is handled.

Public affairs plans should specify the number and types of media (including internal media) who will form the pool. The military will determine the size and composition of the pool. The media representatives should determine who will fill the spaces in the pool.

The subject of ground rules is a very important policy decision that should involve commanders and higher headquarters staffs. When the news media agree to abide by a set of clear ground rules, then clarity is the military's responsibility.

Journalists in a combat zone will receive credentials from the U.S. military and will be required to abide by a clear set of military security ground rules that protect U.S. forces and their operations. Violation of the ground rules can result in suspension of credentials and expulsion from the combat zone of the journalists involved. News organizations will make their best efforts to assign experienced journalists to combat operations and to make them familiar with U.S. military operations. The decision to suspend credentials or expel a reporter should only be made after clear and severe violations have been committed and only with the concurrence of the commander, joint task force, the combatant commander, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs.

Reporters cannot tell the story of a particular unit unless they are with the unit when the story occurs. Journalists will be provided access to all major military units. Special operations restrictions may limit access in some cases. To ensure complete coverage of joint operations, commanders should plan to assist journalists in gaining access to all unclassified forces which are participating in the joint operation, to include those based outside the joint operations area.

Public affairs Marines can only be as effective with the news media as the commander permits. The most important element in the relationship between a journalist and a public affairs Marine is the policy set by the commander.

Military public affairs personnel should act as liaisons but should not interfere with the reporting process. The mission of individual public affairs personnel is to expedite the flow of information about the force and the operation through the civilian and military news media to both external and internal audiences and to help

news media representatives understand the events and occurrences so that coverage is accurate.

If units do not take the news media with them, they may not get coverage commensurate with their participation. There are examples from Desert Storm where units received excellent coverage from journalists who traveled with them. Units that chose not to include the news media received poor press or no press at all. Additionally, under conditions of open coverage, field commanders should be instructed to permit journalists to ride on military vehicles and aircraft whenever feasible.

If the journalist has access to the story but cannot file it, the story will not see print or air time and, as a result, will not exist from the American public's point of view. Commanders should make every effort to assist a journalist to get the story filed as soon as possible.

Consistent with capabilities, the commander will supply public affairs with facilities to enable timely, secure, and compatible transmission of pool material and will make these facilities available whenever possible for filing independent coverage. In cases when Government facilities are unavailable, journalists will, as always, file by any other means available. The commander will not ban communications systems operated by news organizations, but electromagnetic operations security (OPSEC) in battlefield situations may require restrictions on the use of such systems.

These principles will apply as well to the operations of the standing DOD National Media Pool system. The support of the DOD National Media Pool is a priority mission for the joint force commander (JFC). Public affairs plans should anticipate and include these provisions.

The appeal of news media pools for coverage of military operations appears to have lost its luster with the news media. The likely presence of autonomous news media representatives on future battlefields, especially if they are getting more of a story than pool members, could render such pools superfluous. The Marine Corps as an institution and the individuals within it need to accept the challenge of contact with the news media to ensure the Marine Corps' story is told. If the Marine Corps declines that opportunity, it runs the risk of having the news media tell the story without its input.

COVERAGE

The most effective operational public affairs effort is predicated on taking the news media to where there is action. Let reporters go smell it, touch it, and talk to people on the ground. This will help the news media develop a much better appreciation for Marines and their mission. The Marine Corps' best messengers are Marines talking about the Marines they lead or the job they do. Commanders should encourage their Marines to talk to the news media whenever and wherever possible about what they do. Marines can tell the Marine Corps' story better than any chart, graph, or press release.

Historically, the Marine Corps has endorsed and benefited from the practice of embedding news media into the force, adopting reporters as honorary members of a particular unit. This alternative to pooling fosters mutual trust and understanding. Some reporters who are eager to become better educated about the military see embedding as an unparalleled opportunity. They realize that reporters who are truly part of an operational unit may garner the ultimate front-row seat. Embedding raises the reporter's

awareness level and reduces errors in reporting. An embedded reporter should, ideally, come to see himself as part of the Marine team. Furthermore, informed reporters are less likely to violate security guidelines. Because the reporters themselves are in harm's way, along with the Marine unit to which they are assigned, they have a vested interest in complying with security concerns.

Embedding news media is never a sure thing. Commanders must realize that risk is involved. Overall, embedding has been a positive experience for the Marine Corps. During Desert Storm, this policy benefited both the news media and the Marine Corps. Unlike many units from other Services, the I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) allowed coverage of the MEF and in return reached a worldwide audience.

News media coverage will help shape the perception of future operations. The news media will get there, with or without the Marine Corps' assistance, in many cases, well before the Marines' arrival. Forward-thinking commanders will use innovative and creative ways to educate and assist news media located in theater, whether or not a pool is in place. PAOs should accurately apprise staffs that they should anticipate news media presence and assist the commander in determining the best way to assist reporters.

Chapter 3

Policies and Principles

“Our policy is clear: honesty, openness, and accessibility to the maximum extent possible consistent with the demands of national security.”⁵

—General C. C. Krulak, USMC,
31st Commandant, *The Commandant’s
Planning Guidance*

Marine Corps public affairs is a discipline of communication that informs and educates the American people about the performance, capabilities, needs, and activities of the institution during peacetime and during times of conflict. Ideally, public affairs accomplishes this mission by—

- 1 Maximizing disclosure of accurate information with minimum delay so that the public may assess the facts, regardless of the context or whether it helps us in any way, thus ensuring our continued credibility.
- 1 Taking public affairs into account throughout all phases of peacetime and wartime planning and execution to ensure appropriate access to accurate, unclassified, and releasable information.
- 1 Ensuring and maintaining operational security (OPSEC).
- 1 Initiating and supporting activities that foster public awareness of the Marine Corps.
- 1 Supporting and conducting aggressive public affairs programs to inform internal and external audiences.
- 1 Issuing and implementing public affairs guidance (PAG) on Marine Corps plans, policies, and objectives in the form of directives, letters, and messages from the Director of the Division of Public Affairs.

- 1 Supporting DOD and/or joint public affairs operations and organizations. (This may include the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense [OASD] for Public Affairs, Joint Information Bureaus [JIBs], *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, *Navy-Marine Corps Times*, the Fleet Home Town News Center, and the AFRTS.)
- 1 Providing public affairs and news media relations training for Marines and civilian employees.

THE FORMAL BASIS FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS

The first amendment to the Constitution of the United States prohibits unlawfully restricting the free flow of information. It reads, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”⁶ Thomas Jefferson believed that this free flow of information was imperative to the democratic process and that such governments derived their power from the consent of the governed. Few circumstances warrant withholding or delaying information. Three such circumstances are national security, the physical protection of people, and the legally established privacy of individuals.

The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), passed in 1966, guarantees the public’s right to obtain information from the Government that is not classified or otherwise exempted from release. In most cases, FOIA makes disclosure the general rule, not the exception; affords all individuals equal rights of access; places the burden to justify the withholding of a document on the Government, not on the person who requests it; and affords individuals improperly

denied access to documents the legal right to pursue the matter in the courts. However, the Privacy Act limits the Government's ability to publicly release personal information.

IMPLEMENTATION POLICY

Marine Corps Public Affairs actions are guided by DOD guidelines, Joint Doctrine, and the Secretary of the Navy Instruction (SECNAVINST) 5720.44A, *Public Affairs Policy and Regulations*, which emphasize a free flow of information, via appropriate forums and within national security constraints and statutory mandates, to provide information to the Marine Corps community. Joint Publication 3-61, *Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations*, provides overarching guidance for operational PA. The Smith-Mundt Act authorizes the U.S. Government to conduct programs designed to influence foreign publics, although laws such as 18 *United States Code* section 1913 sharply limit any agency of the U.S. Government from conducting programs designed to influence domestic publics.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

A commander's familiarity with the principles of information will add perspective to the news media environment in which public affairs operates. The commander's responsibility is to ensure that all planning for military activities and operations efficiently and effectively addresses the goals set by these principles.

DOD Directive 5122.5, *Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs*, directs the following:

- 1 Information will be made available so that the public may assess and understand the facts about national security, defense strategy, and ongoing joint and multinational operations.
- 1 Requests for information from media organizations and private citizens will be answered in a timely manner.
- 1 Information will be made fully available, consistent with statutory requirements, unless its release is precluded by current and valid security classification. The provisions of the FOIA and the Privacy Act will be complied with in both letter and spirit.
- 1 Information will be made available, without censorship or propaganda, to the men and women of the Armed Forces and their family members.
- 1 Information will not be classified or otherwise withheld to protect the Government from criticism or embarrassment.
- 1 Information will be withheld only when disclosure would adversely affect national and operations security or threaten the safety or privacy of the men and women of the Armed Forces.

The DOD's obligation to provide the public with information on its major programs and operations may require detailed public affairs planning and coordination within DOD and with other Government agencies. The sole purpose of such activity is to expedite the flow of information to the public: Propaganda or

publicity designed to sway or direct public opinion will *not* be included in DOD public affairs programs.

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

The 31st Commandant's Planning Guidance provided definitive public affairs policy guidance:

As with our legislative initiatives, our best spokesmen and women are, and will continue to be, individual Marines demonstrating their capabilities and speaking for and about their Corps. Our goal is to provide an informed perspective concerning Marine Corps capabilities, programs, and intentions to develop a foundation of public understanding and support for our requirements.⁷

The Commandant then issued the following four tasks to Marine Corps public affairs that set the tone for the future:

- 1 Public affairs will expand existing programs throughout the country by using the recruiting and Marine Corps Reserve infrastructure to reinvigorate grass roots support for the Marine Corps.
- 1 HQMC and every subordinate command will have a campaign plan that ensures coordination between public affairs, the Officer of Legislative Affairs (OLA), and all general officers to consistently reiterate and reinforce our capabilities and objectives.
- 1 Commands must plan to permit and support news media coverage and must be prepared to meet, brief, escort, transport,

and host news media personnel to ensure coverage opportunities and accurate content.

- 1 Public information about the Marine Corps (using print and electronic media) will be coordinated by the Director of Public Affairs.

Three-Part Discipline

Public affairs has evolved into a three-part discipline: external relations, community relations, and internal information. An integrated public affairs effort embodies all three in garrison and during operations.

External relations (sometimes called news media relations) provides an indirect method of communication with the public through the news media. Dealing directly with the media requires the highest level of professional competence and sophistication. The public information responsibility is focused primarily on the accurate and timely dissemination of information to local area and national news media about the people, actions, and activities of the Marine Corps. This function involves daily contact with representatives of the civilian print and electronic news media. Although timely reporting is vital to a successful relationship with the civilian news media, credibility is equally essential to a professional and enduring relationship. Requests for information in response to news media queries must be responded to quickly, accurately, and candidly. Although the Marine Corps cannot dictate which stories will receive coverage in the civilian news media, efforts to tell the story from a Marine Corps perspective must be pursued.

Community relations extends beyond issuing information. It involves fostering positive relations with the neighboring

community, including Marine Corps Reserve components, in a direct community and military interface. Well-conducted community relations enhance readiness by fostering hometown support. A good-neighbor policy is established through involvement with the communities and extends support to families of deployed Marines. It also helps reinforce the idea that the Marine Corps is a meaningful and rewarding career choice for America's youth. Close, positive relations with neighboring communities inspire patriotism, and that patriotism translates into recruitment and retention opportunities. Every reasonable effort will be made to develop and maintain sound community activities.

During deployments and operations, community relations efforts take many forms and can be organized by units, chaplains, public affairs personnel, or concerned individuals. From a unit venturing out in town to paint an orphanage in Pattaya, Thailand, to visits to schools and community centers by Marines and sailors throughout the world, the best picture we paint of the Marine Corps is through community involvement. Navy chaplains function as a tremendous organizational resource during these events. Civil affairs, when deployed, will coordinate community interaction in an operation and or exercise. Although public affairs will release information to the news media, CA will be responsible for the direct release of information to the local population. Civil affairs and public affairs will need to coordinate actions within the information operations cell to ensure that common themes and messages are maintained. The objective of an internal information program is to ensure that all segments of the Marine Corps community (Marines, their family members, civilian employees, and retirees) are fully and continually informed regarding Marine Corps programs, policies, and events. Internal information is a key enabler for commanders, whose decisions affect cohesion,

morale, quality of life, and retention. The unrestricted flow of unclassified information applies to internal information programs in that Marine Corps personnel are entitled to the same access to news as the public.

Aspects of this three-part discipline often overlap. The distinction between the external and internal audience is becoming blurred because of the impact of technology, such as the Internet, and that more married Marines live in the local community. Although PAOs still specifically target the Marine family through internal information channels, they do so with an understanding that every form of communication intended for an internal audience will be received, assessed, and evaluated by people outside of the Marine Corps. Providing pertinent information to Marines, families and dependents, and civilian employees boosts morale; relieves family and dependent anxiety; and reduces uncertainty, rumor, and misinformation. Such information enhances the mission capability of involved Marines.

Principles

Since all Marines are potential spokespersons, they should all be aware of the fundamental tenets that support public affairs strategies and guide planning and execution of public affairs operations—in peacetime and in conflict or war. Knowledge of these principles can assist anyone who may be in a position to represent the Marine Corps to news media outlets. Basic public affairs principles form the foundation for conducting operations in the global information environment.

Honesty builds credibility. Trust and confidence in the Marine Corps results when external and internal audiences understand the Marine Corps and the reasons for its actions, decisions, and

policies. Providing knowledge of the Marine Corps' culture, units, and individual Marines, ethics, values, policies, and procedures creates credibility in the eyes of the public. Because every active and Reserve component Marine, civilian, and family member is perceived as a credible spokesperson, telling the *factual* Marine Corps story is a total Marine Corps responsibility. Once lost, credibility cannot be easily regained. The quickest way to destroy believability is to misrepresent the truth. Communicating different messages to different audiences is also a sure way to destroy the source's credibility. When credibility is undermined, communication becomes ineffective and achieving information objectives is impaired.

Bad news doesn't get better with age. In the global information environment, information flow about the Marine Corps and its operations will be both pervasive and quick. Marines cannot control news media coverage, nor should they try to do so. DOD policy is that information will not be classified or otherwise withheld to protect the Government from criticism or embarrassment. Information can be withheld only when its disclosure would adversely affect security, threaten safety, or invade the privacy of members of the military community. The Marine Corps will practice the principle of maximum disclosure with minimum delay, regardless of the nature, adverse or favorable, of the news. Marine Corps spokespeople must avoid speculation and confirm the accuracy of their information. Withholding or appearing to withhold negative information creates the perception of coverups, leads to speculation, and damages the credibility of the Marine Corps.

If news is out, it's out. The global information environment makes information accessible to larger audiences and makes it easier to disseminate. As the value of information increases, the ability to limit or restrict its flow decreases. Leaders must

recognize this; consider the impact that information availability will have on missions; and prepare to address issues openly, honestly, and in a timely manner. Waiting for others to shape the battlefield is inconsistent with our warfighting doctrine—by addressing questions as rapidly as possible, we can retain our credibility and initiative. Denying information about, or refusing to comment on, policies, operations, activities, positions, or procedures that are clearly in the public domain undermines confidence in the Marine Corps. Additionally, waiting for all of the facts can often prevent the message from being considered by the news media due to their deadlines.

Telling our story is good for the Marine Corps. Providing accurate and timely information about the force and its operation will contribute to mission accomplishment during stability and support operations in particular, but also during war. Such information can communicate restraint, indicate perseverance, and serve as a deterrent. It can clarify the nature of the operational mandate and the Marine Corps' efforts to operate within stated guidelines. The active release of complete and accurate information influences the perception of events, clarifies public understanding, and frames the public debate. It preempts attempts to misrepresent situations through intentional misinformation or disinformation efforts by adversaries and is the most effective tool for countering the effect of enemy information operations.

The Marine Corps family is important. Internal audiences include Marines, civilian employees, retirees, and all affiliated family members throughout the Marine Corps' active and Reserve components. This audience must be well informed to ensure maximum effectiveness and the highest sustainable morale. Because this group constitutes potential spokespeople, effectively managed internal information programs contribute to their ability to accurately represent the Marine Corps.

The news media is not the enemy. The vast majority of journalists and the organizations they represent are committed to the ideals of providing responsible, accurate, and balanced coverage. Good reporters will thoroughly investigate issues and ask tough, challenging questions. They will seek information, interpretation, and perspective. However, many reporters today have not served in the military, and their inexperience and uncertainty may create communication gaps. Marines may need to educate them on military operations and help them understand the significance of the events on which they are reporting. The best way to give reporters a chance to know Marines, understand the operation, and experience the Marine Corps is to incorporate, or embed, them into units. This provides journalists with a unique perspective and usually results in the best coverage.

Practice and provide security at the source. The characteristics of the military and global information environments essentially render field censorship in its traditional sense impractical as well as nearly impossible. All individuals must be responsible for protecting sensitive information. Whether being interviewed by a reporter or sharing news with a spouse or a friend, communicators must be aware of operational security. Any information disclosed may become public. The standard must be to practice security at the source by not sharing information that is inappropriate for release.

Release of Information

Although we have a legal and moral responsibility to provide the public with as much unclassified information as possible, we have an equal responsibility to withhold classified information, thus protecting secrecy and surprise. The fact that we have a dual responsibility to release some information while withholding

other information may require public affairs practitioners to release information *selectively*. The selective release of information may lead to a variety of unintended but often predictable effects. News media personnel may not understand why some information is releasable and other information is not—especially once it becomes evident that the military withheld that information. On occasion, it may be wise to quietly explain to reporters the reasons behind selective release. American and allied news media personnel have a very good record of maintaining the confidentiality of such information. Throughout the history of the Marine Corps, we have found it expedient to take numerous civilian reporters into our confidence on the battlefield. Although such boldness must be tempered with judgment lest it border on recklessness, not once has that confidence been broken.

A Lesson Learned

One of the lessons learned over the past decade is that *public affairs personnel must be deployed early*. News media interest will be intense at the outset of operations, especially during the initial deployment of forces. A Marine Corps commander's first contact during a peacetime or wartime operation will often be with a news reporter. Journalists will be present in the area of operations (AO) before Marine Corps forces arrive, will often be well established, and will sometimes know and understand the AO.

The news media will closely cover the deployment of American forces, their arrival in the theater, and their initial operations. Because national and international news media will be present from the moment forces arrive, public affairs personnel need to be deployed in the first hours of an operation to support the commander and the force in their interactions with the news media.

The PAO can significantly reduce the distractions created by the demands of the news media, thereby allowing the commander to focus on his mission and his Marines' welfare. Once operations have been initiated and equilibrium begins to return, news media attention will diminish until a significant event occurs or there is a notable change in the situation. Typically, news media interest will resurface as the force completes its mission and begins to redeploy.

RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

The operational aim for public affairs is to disseminate information deemed releasable to the public more quickly and with more credibility than any adversary. As with combat operations, relative speed and concentration of effort matter most to prevent enemy disinformation.

We have a responsibility to take public affairs considerations into account as we conduct actions across the range of military operations. Although our legal and moral responsibility to keep the public informed remains constant, the impact of public information on our operational objectives throughout the range of military operations does not.

At all levels, public affairs operations are critical to the ability of the Marine Corps to accomplish the mission. This is especially true because the global information environment spans the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.

At the strategic level, public affairs helps establish the foundation and framework for conducting Marine Corps operations in support of national security. Strategic public affairs efforts inform internal and external audiences about our organization, training,

and capabilities. They help demonstrate our readiness to react promptly, decisively, and appropriately. They are planned to clarify the linkage between national strategic goals and how the Marine Corps will contribute to the overall success of the strategy.

At the operational level, public affairs supports the commander by providing an assessment of a critical aspect of the information environment in which his force will conduct operations. It identifies public affairs issues for his consideration; assists him in evaluating the public affairs implications of current and future campaigns, operations, and plans; and ensures that the higher headquarters and commander's public affairs guidance is integrated into the planning process. At the operational level, public affairs also plays a critical role in facilitating news media efforts to cover the operation and/or exercise and in supporting the commander's requirement to meet the internal information needs and expectations of the force.

At the tactical level, public affairs is conducted to achieve a balanced flow of accurate and timely information that communicates the Marine Corps' perspective but does not violate OPSEC. It assists commanders in implementing a program that fulfills the internal information needs and expectations of the force. It provides an interface between Marines at the tactical level and news media representatives in the AO.

News media coverage can instantly span the three levels, and incidents at the tactical level may have immediate consequences at the strategic level. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-2, *Campaigning*, points out: "The news media, because of its global reach and ability to influence popular opinion, can have operational effects—that is, it can often elevate even minor tactical acts to political importance."⁸ The actions of

a single Marine at the tactical level can be elevated by instantaneous news media coverage of those actions.

Opportunities to tell the Marine Corps' story can affect the morale of Marines and sailors. If their story—good or bad—is reported, morale is often enhanced. If the news media go home, morale is also affected. As an AO becomes more stable, the news media's interest wanes. Although this may seem on the surface to be advantageous to the commander, it may lead to a loss of interest in the deployed forces by the public at home, and this can affect morale. In the latter part of Operation Restore Hope, one of the news media representatives confided to the operation's commander, "This operation is boring, general, you're a success." The news media lights were turned off, and Marine personnel on the ground felt forgotten.

In addition to the domestic or international impact of news coverage, it also effects our adversaries. For example, news media coverage of enemy troops surrendering on the battlefield could quickly affect the enemy's level of public support around the world. Similarly, international news reports of the capture of an enemy's capital, heard by enemy units in the field, may adversely affect enemy troop leadership and morale down to the lowest levels. This may be reason enough to consider embedding news media into maneuver and frontline units.

We can often predict when news media coverage may have a greater or lesser impact on our operational objectives across the range of military operations. However, PA operations do not encourage news media coverage of certain operations to achieve operational objectives. We cannot control news media coverage, nor should we attempt to. Rather, we make available timely, unclassified information regarding all of our operations, and we provide as much access to those operations as is feasible based on

both logistical and security constraints. Any influence certain information may have in the minds of our adversaries or anyone else is merely a secondary result of our consistently providing timely, unclassified information. It is *not a design or intent of our public affairs program.*

Chapter 4

Command Responsibility

“I’ve never had that [a promise made by a member of the media to keep a conversation off-the-record] violated—ever. It’s unprofessional and stupid . . . to hate the media. They are not going to go away.”⁹

—General Walter E. Boomer,
USMC (Ret.) Commanding General,
I Marine Expeditionary Force
Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

The impact that emerging technologies and the evolving global news media environment will have on all aspects of future military operations is difficult to fully anticipate or grasp. One thing is certain: the pressures and influences of the mass media on the commander's battlespace will be profound regardless of the type of operation. The commander will be forced to consider the implications of news media at every turn. We will see more and more real-time reporting, which means the commander must prepare for the reporter who lands in the middle of an operation and is capable of sending live reports back to an awaiting audience. The unavoidable effect of the evolving communication environment is that an event will be occurring at the same time that the commander is being asked by the news media to respond—and this response will be broadcast in near-real time. This dynamic environment will challenge commanders and their public affairs personnel to plan accordingly.

The commander can prepare the public information environment most directly through a credible relationship with the news media. Basically, news media relations comes down to building and maintaining professional standards, mutual trust, and credibility. The commander can provide the story—and access to it—or risk having reporters finding their own stories. History shows that reporting is more accurate, balanced, and factual when commanders are proactive rather than reactive. The simple fact is that military operations will always be news, and the news media will be there to cover the action. The demands brought to bear by the news media will undeniably affect the ability of the commander and the organization to function at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, regardless of the mission. The commander has little room to maneuver and ever-diminishing time in which to respond to the news media. The commander must understand how news media considerations affect the planning process,

preoperation strikes, the actual operation, and post-operation activities. Although working with the news media inherently introduces challenges, public affairs can be a force multiplier for the commander by informing internal and external audiences.

Public affairs operations are a fundamental tool of competent leadership, a critical element of effective battlefield command, and an essential element of mission accomplishment. Effective leaders employ a coordinated public affairs strategy to help reduce distractions, rumors, misinformation, boredom, uncertainty, fear, loneliness, confusion, and other factors that cause stress and undermine efficient operations. They integrate the public affairs program into their effort to build unit cohesion and enhance confidence. They conduct public affairs operations to increase understanding, dedication, discipline, and the will to win. Goals in this arena should include—

- 1 Creating an informed public.
- 1 Maximizing opportunities for interaction between Marines and their surrounding community through innovative and aggressive community relations efforts.
- 1 Supporting a program of internal information that keeps Marines, civilian employees, and their families well-informed.

The commander sets the tone for public affairs operations. Either directly or indirectly, the commander is the unit spokesperson.

CONSIDERATIONS

The public affairs considerations described in the following paragraphs will assist commanders in performing the public affairs mission.

Most issues, plans, and events contain elements of interest to the general public, the news media, and the committed forces and their families. This is particularly true of military operations, which often draw public attention as personnel and equipment prepare for upcoming assignments. Unit alerts, increased aircraft activity, and rail or ship loading are highly visible and will almost inevitably lead to news media inquiries. Such activities may also cause concern among unit personnel and family members. Commanders and staffs at all levels should anticipate such interest as part of the normal planning process and be prepared to respond through internal and external information outlets.

Complete integration of public affairs personnel in all staff planning is essential to ensure an effective public affairs operation. By being fully involved, the PAO will be in a better position to advise the commander about the public affairs environment, current news media interests, public-opinion concerns, command information matters, and the public affairs implications of evolving operation plans. The PAO will also be better prepared to anticipate and respond to the news media while safeguarding security and sensitivity requirements. To adequately accomplish the mission, public affairs personnel must have appropriate security clearances.

External information, internal information, and community relations are complementary functions and should be addressed simultaneously when developing the public affairs program. External information operations that accommodate local and military reporters as well as national and international news media will help ensure that the commander communicates with all of the important audiences. Initial plans should consider the inclusion of local news media on deploying aircraft (established guidelines and appropriate waivers for requesting news media

transportation should be used). This ensures early access for journalists who are conveniently available and familiar with the unit. These journalists are then able to serve a dual role of reporting to the American people while helping the commander communicate with the unit's family members through local news media outlets in addition to the unit's command information program.

Effective public affairs operations should be consistent with security concerns. Commanders and their public affairs, security, and operations officers must balance the need for news media access to forces with the imperative to ensure security. This includes both protecting classified information and controlling the essential elements of friendly information associated with all operations. Achieving the necessary balance requires a coordinated effort to identify what degree of access will be provided to news media personnel and what activities they will be allowed to observe. The guiding principle is security at the source.

Unity of effort is achieved by developing, approving, distributing, and using of DOD-approved PAG. The PAG is an information package containing such items as public affairs policy, news statements regarding the current operation, answers to news media questions, and community relations guidance. It is used to support the public discussion of defense issues and operations. Armed with a coordinated, DOD-approved PAG, talking points, and answers to anticipated questions, commanders and their PAOs are able to provide the most accurate information to their own forces and to the American people. Speaking with one voice involves close coordination among all those involved, including agencies outside the DOD.

Accuracy, balance, fairness, and timeliness are the standards for successful dealings with the news media. Success does not necessarily guarantee that all news media stories will be positive or

supportive. From the earliest planning stages of an operation, accuracy and timeliness of the information made available to the public are essential in establishing and maintaining credibility with the news media, Congress, the general public, our allies, and the operating forces. Commanders must realize that the information they control at the tactical level is the most perishable and, therefore, must be released while still newsworthy and capable of telling the story.

A well-planned, proactive public affairs program provides the best opportunity for public understanding of operations. DOD policy mandates open access consistent with OPSEC and the safety and individual privacy of the operating forces. Planning for news media participation in any operation should be tailored to anticipate technologically sophisticated news media personnel. The successful public affairs operations will be those that have dedicated the necessary personnel, equipment, transportation, and communications resources to meet the prevailing demands for information.

CREDIBILITY

The cornerstone of an effective public affairs program is credibility—the PAO’s credibility with the commander, the staff, and the news media. *Credibility and good working relations with the news media begins with the PAO and news media interacting on a regular basis.* The PAO’s credibility is predicated on the trust, confidence, and access that staff commanders provide them. To conduct an effective public affairs effort, the PAO must have virtually unlimited access to all levels of staff, be included in all levels of staff planning, and have a close working relationship with a

knowledgeable staff. This requires the commander's active support. The news media are unlikely to deal openly with the PAO unless it senses that he has the commander's confidence and the support of the staff. This is especially true in times of contingency operations, incidents, or volatile issues because of the ever-narrowing window of opportunity in which to respond. If the PA staff is slow to respond to news media requests or queries due to poor staff coordination or support, the news media will look elsewhere for the information they need, and we will have lost the initiative. The PAO must be able to articulate complex policy decisions and the commander's intent to a civilian audience in a manner that stands up to news media scrutiny.

The PAO is more than a mere collector and conduit of command information. PAOs are special staff officers trained to advise commanders on public affairs. Marine Corps PAOs know their profession. They know the news media, appreciate its distinct appetites, and understand that it is a dynamic, constantly evolving business. Most PAOs have attended the Defense Information School, many have majored in journalism or related studies in college, and some have advanced degrees in this career field.

To be effective in this role, in either peacetime or wartime, the PAO must also be able to actively participate in the commander's decisionmaking process—in effect, to provide public affairs situational awareness. PAOs must provide commanders with a continuous assessment of the nature of the communication environment and the likely effects of public information both on command operations and various relevant audiences. PAOs are most effective if they have direct access to commanders or to the executive officer or chief of staff as directed. They should not be subordinated under any staff section. Direct and timely access to the commander greatly enhances the PAO's credibility with the

rest of the staff, subordinate commanders, and especially the news media.

An effective PAO gets to know the reporters and other members of the news media with whom he deals. This requires spending some time together, perhaps even in a purely social setting. This helps to build credibility and trust, and it can also serve as an early warning system. A good relationship with the news media can present the opportunity to turn around an inaccurate story before it is too late.

The PAO must always be accessible. When he is away from his desk or in the field, the PAO should wear a pager and carry a cellular phone. The PAO is of no use to either the news media or the chain of command if he cannot be reached. His pager, cellular phone, and home phone numbers should be readily available. Availability is part of the job.

THE COMMANDER, OPERATIONS, AND PLANNING

Commanders should ensure that public affairs activities are tailored to support missions across the entire range of military operations from full-scale war to the many types of operations categorized as MOOTW. Commanders and their public affairs personnel should be prepared to discuss, among other topics, organizational structure, strategy, objectives, tactics, training, logistics, intelligence, and troop support issues.

Experience shows that news media interest in humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, peacekeeping, and similar MOOTW peaks early then diminishes gradually as the operation becomes routine. Planning for news media operations should reflect that curve.

Public affairs personnel, logistic, and other news media support might be front-loaded during the early stages of an operation with the expectation that they could be drawn down as the operation loses its news media appeal.

The following specific missions involve unique issues that should be addressed as part of the public affairs planning and communication processes.

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief. These missions involve a delicate balance of political and military objectives. They include operational and information coordination with nongovernmental relief organizations and often the representatives of other nations contributing to the effort. Commanders and their public affairs staffs must exercise care so that, in their attempts to demonstrate their responsiveness, concern, and assistance, they do not preempt the authority of the political leadership or appear to be taking credit for success at the expense of other contributing parties.

Counterdrug Operations. A number of factors are unique to counterdrug operations, such as a high degree of interagency and international coordination. Most significantly, the legal and law enforcement aspects of counterdrug operations are extremely sensitive and generate additional concerns about the release of information to the public. The inappropriate release of information could threaten the personal safety of military personnel, civilian law enforcement officials, and other participants, as well as the success of follow-on operations, pending judicial cases, and the security of intelligence systems and sources.

Combatting Terrorism. Because terrorists generally seek maximum publicity, preventing coverage that could reveal tactics,

techniques, and procedures used in combatting terrorism organizations may be impossible. Public affairs planners should anticipate and make accommodations for the probability of live and near-live direct news media coverage activity and strive to provide as much information as possible to the public about DOD activities, consistent with the operational, technological, and information security. In making information available to the news media, commanders must delicately balance the legitimate information requirements of their DOD and civilian audiences against the revelation of useful information to terrorists.

Peace Operations. Although similar in their objectives to ensure stability in a particular region or country, peacekeeping and peace enforcement involve different public affairs challenges. A primary concern during peace operations is that the peacekeeping forces are not and must not be perceived as taking sides in the conflict.

Crisis Management. In times of crisis, public and news media interest in developing situations will be heightened and pervasive during the decision process and political, economic, and military responses to the situation. Public affairs planning will require considerable interagency coordination to ensure that information plans are accurate and consistent in communicating the military aspects of the crisis. Military public affairs personnel must understand and respect the different responsibilities of the military and political leadership and focus on the military aspects of the situation.

Planning Considerations

Commanders need to consider many issues when planning for public affairs. The following paragraphs cover the major issues.

News Media Access. Commanders must understand that reporters will desire to move as close to the action as possible to gain a complete understanding of the operation and to expand on background information. Commanders who have laid the proper news media training foundation will be able to incorporate news media representatives within their units with minimal disruption. Within OPSEC constraints, this close-in reporting will provide the American public with insight that captures the preparation, professionalism, and capabilities of the Marine Corps. This should be a consideration when preparing surface and helicopter load plans.

Security. Security issues are fundamental to all public affairs planning. Inclusion of the PAO in the planning process will help to ensure that information is properly categorized by its sensitivity. Although security review of news media products may occasionally be necessary, the practice of security at the source is the primary protector of security and always governs discussions with news media representatives.

News Media Pools. Contingency planning should include provision of equipment, transportation, and communications assets necessary to help the news media gather information and file stories about the Marine Corps. Commanders should realize that the formation of a pool places additional news media support requirements on the organization. Planning must include detailed provisions for accommodating and supporting the news media, including providing access to communications. Plans must address measures for handling those reporters who are not members of the pool, but who appear in the joint operations area. Event-specific (e.g., a raid or patrol) and contingency news media pools, usually of short duration, may occasionally be necessary. These should be kept to a minimum and disbanded as soon as

open reporting is practical. See appendix A, *DOD National News Media Pool Support*, for guidelines.

Combat Camera. The deployment of joint combat camera teams provides the commander with a sophisticated capability to enhance both operational and public affairs missions. Joint combat camera teams are operationally controlled by the J-3 and support the entire spectrum of an operation. Organizationally, Marine combat camera assets fall under the G-3/S-3 but are often assigned operationally to the PAO. Public affairs imagery requirements for this resource must be identified and prioritized throughout the planning cycle.

Internal Information. The DOD command information program helps commanders in their leadership communications functions. It provides timely and accurate information about environment, pay, housing, personnel policies, and other issues that affect the morale, welfare, health, and safety of DOD personnel and their families. Various resources are available through the Armed Forces Information Service to include deployed information services.

Armed Forces Radio and Television Service. The AFRTS supports the DOD command information program by providing a broad range of broadcast information and entertainment programming.

Every phase of public affairs planning should remain in sync with preparation of the operation plan (OPLAN) that it supports and should include coordination with the host nation and country team. Therefore, the public affairs portion of the OPLAN should be developed with the OPLAN so that the transportation, communications, billeting, equipment, and personnel resources required

to support the public affairs plan can be built into the total operational resource requirements.

Guidance

Unity of effort is central to the public affairs mission. The development and timely dissemination of DOD-approved PAG ensures that all information and policies are in consonance when responding to the information demands of joint operations. See appendix B, Public Affairs Guidance.

The first step in achieving public understanding is translating the mission and unclassified objectives of the operation into a form that can be easily understood by the general public. This information is further developed, coordinated, and disseminated in the form of PAG. PAG conforms to OPSEC and the privacy requirements of the members of the force. The continuous flow of updated PAG among all participating organizations is critical for remaining abreast of current developments.

Commanders and their public affairs personnel at the tactical and operational levels are most likely to find themselves confronting detailed questions about the forces involved, their capabilities, and their immediate objectives. Officials and spokespeople at the strategic level will most often concern themselves with matters of general policy and political considerations. The approved PAG serves as a source document for responding to news media representatives and military journalists at all levels.

Ideally, the development of PAG begins with the commander's public affairs staff. However, if the situation does not allow, PAG development will be assumed by the next higher headquarters. The operational staff and the PAO, working together, are in the

best position to recommend public affairs policy, draft appropriate statements, and identify the issues and responses most likely to be of interest to both external and internal audiences. PAG is approved by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. Public affairs offices should coordinate all proposed PAG with their legal advisors.

Public affairs, CA, and PSYOP messages must be coordinated during the planning process and throughout an operation as the situation develops. A continual exchange of information must exist during execution. Although public affairs, CA, and PSYOP messages may be in different formats and delivered via different news media, they must not contradict one another or the credibility of all three will be lost. Although each has specific audiences, information will often overlap audiences. This overlap makes message deconfliction crucial. Under no circumstances will public affairs personnel engage in PSYOP activities, or vice versa. The joint task force (JTF) commander will establish separate agencies and facilities for public affairs and PSYOP activities. At no time will PSYOP personnel address the news media, unless such an address is related to coverage of the PSYOP function.

Marine Corps Planning Process

The Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPPE) establishes procedures for analyzing a mission, developing and wargaming course(s) of action (COAs) against the threat, comparing friendly COAs against the commander's criteria and each other, selecting a COA, and preparing an operation order (OPORD) for execution. The MCPPE organizes the planning process into six manageable, logical steps. It provides the commander and staff with a means to organize their planning activities and transmit the plan to subordinates and subordinate commands. Interactions among

various planning steps allow a concurrent, coordinated effort that maintains flexibility, makes efficient use of the time available, and facilitates continuous information sharing. Through this process, all levels of command can begin their planning effort with a common understanding of the mission and commander's guidance. The six integrated steps of this process are mission analysis, COA development, COA wargaming, COA comparison and decision, orders development, and transition.

Public affairs must participate in the MCPP to ensure that it is fully considered in the COA process and then integrated into the OPORD that is the product of the process. The planner uses the PA estimate, the guidance provided in the PAG (if developed already), and other considerations to assist him in this endeavor. An overview of public affairs in the MCPP includes—

- 1 **Mission Analysis**—the first step in planning. The purpose of mission analysis is to review and analyze orders, guidance, and other information provided by higher headquarters and produce a unit mission statement. Mission analysis supplies public affairs planners with insights into the raw inputs and the subsequent analysis that ultimately shapes the mission statement. This information assists the planner in determining how public affairs might aid the commander in accomplishing his mission while, at the same time, effectively dealing with the news media. This phase also provides an opportunity for the public affairs planner to inject issues into the analysis and the specified and mission-essential tasks. A public affairs estimate is the result of mission analysis (see appendix D, Public Affairs Estimate).
- 1 **COA Development**—the planners use the mission statement (which includes tasking and intent from higher headquarters),

the commander's intent, and the commander's planning guidance to develop several COAs. Public affairs planners assist in the process by identifying issues that should be included in each COA. Each prospective COA is examined to ensure that it is suitable, feasible, different, acceptable, and complete with respect to the current and anticipated situation, the mission, and the commander's intent. In accordance with the commander's guidance, approved COAs are further developed in greater detail. The public affairs planner gains insights into the concerns of all other staff sections as well as possible actions the commander may choose.

- 1 **COA Wargaming**—each friendly COA is examined against selected threat COAs. COA wargaming involves a detailed assessment of each COA as it pertains to the threat and the environment. Public affairs planners lend their expertise to this process. COA wargaming assists all of the planners in identifying strengths and weaknesses, associated risks, and asset shortfalls for each friendly COA. It will also identify branches and potential sequels that may require additional planning. Short of executing the COA, COA wargaming provides the most reliable basis for understanding and improving each COA. It gives the public affairs planner valuable information that can be used to prepare Annex F, Public Affairs, to the OPORD. (See appendix E, Preparation of Annex F.)
- 1 **COA Comparison and Decision**—the commander evaluates all friendly COAs—against established criteria, then against each other—and selects the COA that he deems most likely to accomplish the mission. Here the PAO will learn the relative strengths and weaknesses of the selected COA and will be better able to plan news media operations.
- 1 **Orders Development**—the staff takes the commander's COA decision, intent, and guidance, and develops orders to direct

the actions of the unit. Orders serve as the principal means by which the commander expresses his decision, intent, and guidance. Public affairs planners finalize Annex F during this phase. (See appendix F, Annex F, Public Affairs.)

1. **Transition**—an orderly handover of a plan or order as it is passed to those tasked with execution of the operation. It provides those who will execute the plan or order with the situational awareness and rationale for key decisions necessary to ensure that there is a coherent shift from planning to execution. Because a public affairs planner was involved in the entire process, the commander can be confident that public affairs issues will be fully integrated into the execution phase.

MAKE NEWS MEDIA RELATIONS A UNIT CONCERN

The commander is not always the best person with whom the news media should talk. For example, the best spokesperson about a light armored vehicle or a tank is the Marine who drives one. The news media is not the message. The news media is the messenger. *Marines are the message.*

When appropriate, commanders should encourage their Marines to talk to the news media, especially when reporters ask questions about a Marine's job or mission. To ensure that Marines understand the role of the news media, commanders should include realistic news media training in all exercises, at every level possible. To the extent possible, all the Marines in the command should be aware of differences among and within the various news media organizations and be familiar with possible lines of questioning during interviews. All Marines need to be briefed on

the various formats for coverage. (See appendix C, Meeting the News Media.)

When Marines of any rank meet the news media, they do not have to be glib or have a rapid-fire delivery—they do have to be right. It is wise to take a moment or two to form answers. Former Defense Secretary William Perry used to bow his head in thought before replying to a question. Sometimes 10 or 15 seconds would go by, a seemingly interminable time when the interview was live, before Secretary Perry would speak. He was sometimes criticized for being slow or ponderous, but during his tenure he was never guilty of misspeaking or putting his foot in his mouth. Marines in the command must be briefed on the mission and what information (if any) may not be divulged. Answers should be short (less than 20 seconds), and Marines should use words that are readily understandable to the general public. This means using few acronyms and keeping military jargon to a minimum. Avoid the reply, “no comment.” That statement often comes across as indication of guilt or a coverup.

Commanders must consider the effect of news media coverage on unit morale. What Marines are told by their friends and family at home about the mission may be good for morale or it may be detrimental. A commander has some control over the information the public receives. He should actively encourage the public affairs team to continually provide coverage to hometown news media through internal communication channels and assets. This requires the commander to ensure that the public affairs team is equipped to effectively communicate with such news media outlets and to distribute their journalistic products. The commander can also facilitate hometown coverage by inviting and embedding local newspaper, TV, and radio personnel into the unit. During joint operations, the joint force commander must approve embedding news media into units.

Operations Security

The inevitable presence of the news media during military operations complicates OPSEC. All commanders and their Marines are concerned that the accurate and speedy release of information does not aid and abet the enemy. As part of the global information infrastructure, the news media portray and offer commentary on military activities in the battlespace—both preparatory to and during the battle. No doubt our opponents will be watching and listening to news media coverage of operations. News media portrayal of military activities before hostilities can help to deter actual hostilities and/or build public support for inevitable hostilities. However, the presence of the news media in the operational area, with the capability to transmit information on a real-time basis to a worldwide audience, has the potential to be a source of information for adversaries.

OPSEC planners must keep these considerations in mind when determining which aspects of a military operation must be denied to the adversary. OPSEC planners must work closely with military public affairs personnel to develop guidelines that can be used by both military and news media personnel to avoid inadvertent disclosure of critical information that could, ultimately, increase the risk to the lives of U.S. and/or multinational military personnel.

Public affairs must walk a fine line between the public's right to know and friendly forces' security requirements. The public does not necessarily need to know everything that military commanders know, when they know it. We release information freely as long as it does not compromise national security, OPSEC, the physical welfare of our people, and the right to privacy as defined by law. Consequently, one of the paramount requirements for public affairs operations is to make certain that all officers and

enlisted personnel know what they can talk about and what is sensitive—and why. In joint operations, the PAO should make sure that all Services are working under the same ground rules. The release of information has to be coordinated just like any other combat activity.

THE COMMANDER AND THE NEWS MEDIA

Although the military often accuses the news media of not reporting in context, the military has been guilty of not giving the news media the context they need. Marine leaders are the obvious experts on the missions and capabilities of naval forces. The American people have come to expect access to the person in charge—the one making the decisions, not a spokesperson. The news media, particularly television, provide that public access to Marine leaders. Commanders must seek every opportunity to use the news media to reach a greater audience to explain their mission, its importance, and the risks involved. The commander who chooses not to speak cedes the information battlefield to critics and analysts who are uninformed about the true situation on the ground, how the mission relates to the situation, and the capabilities of the Marine units involved.

Commanders should, with the assistance of the PAO, seek to understand the news media presence in detail. The commander must be thoroughly briefed before meeting the press. This briefing may include a practice interview. It should also include a list of possible questions and answers. Commanders should know who is coming and who is already there. This means which news organizations and, ideally, which reporters. *The Washington Post* may be after a completely different story than *USA Today*. Television news organizations will ask different types of questions

than the entertainment news media or the print press. Will there be a news conference or selected interviews on location? If the former, who will host it? For the overall mission, the commander will be in demand, but if he is not available to conduct the news conference, an operations officer or planner should do it. Although the PAO should know how to do these briefings, the officer closest to the operation should conduct it to provide more thorough and credible answers. Other formats also exist, ranging from an open-ended interview to a brief telephone interview. Commanders and their staffs need to know the format in advance and determine how to respond.

The PAO should establish a news media center where news media representatives can have ready access to, but not interfere with, ongoing operations. This center need not be elaborate, but it must be an easily identifiable physical location—even if it is merely the back of a particular high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV). On joint operations, a joint news media center will be part of, or at least connected to, the JIB. Depending on Marine responsibilities within the JTF, the Marine PAO may have the responsibility of setting up and/or running this joint bureau. Similarly, if the operation involves allies or coalition partners, a combined or multinational information bureau will be established.

Logistical support of these news media centers is a PAO responsibility. Specific equipment requirements will depend on geography and the mission. If the mission is in the continental United States (CONUS), the bare minimum requirements will include a serviceable laptop computer and a cellular phone. In overseas deployments, add a compact satellite phone.

The Marine commander has always had to operate in a complex environment. Friction, uncertainty, fluidity, disorder, and danger

are fundamental properties of human conflict. Dealing with the news media engenders an atmosphere with similar characteristics—but the news media is not the enemy unless we make them so. The evolution of the local, national, and international news media has added new dimensions to all levels of military operations. The commander's responsibility is to see that dealings with the news media are more communicative than confrontational.

THE COMMANDER AND THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

Although public affairs is primarily a commander's concern, the commander does not have the time to handle the public affairs duties or to constantly deal with the news media. However, the PAO, who is a key member of the staff and is the commander's public affairs alter ego, can relieve him of much of that burden. To do this effectively, the commander must ensure that the public affairs staff is integrated into the planning and operations process.

General Walter Boomer, a former director of Marine Corps public affairs and later Assistant Commandant, relied on skilled public affairs personnel to handle the on-site news media for the MEF that he commanded during the Persian Gulf war. As a battlefield commander, General Boomer took reporters, TV crews, and photographers with him into battle. He also ordered all of his subordinate commanders to facilitate the efforts of the press. However, the care and feeding of the news media, requests for interviews, and many of the briefings were handled by PAOs. General Boomer knew how important news media coverage was to the Marines and their operation, but he also had a battle to win. He gave good commander's guidance to his public affairs staff

and subordinate commanders. The result was both a successful military operation and good press for the Marine Corps.

The best place to inculcate public affairs planning considerations and public affairs staff work into an organization is during exercises—especially command post exercises (CPXs). All exercises should include full public affairs participation. Failure to include the public affairs staff and infrastructure in all aspects of an exercise could result in serious deficiencies in public affairs support during an actual operation. All aspects of the public affairs process should be exercised while paying particular attention to coordinating with the operational staff, the resourcing of all public affairs functions, and identifying and addressing OPSEC concerns.

Although this publication discusses the importance of the PAO, commanders at echelons of command that do not have a dedicated PAO must still address public affairs issues. Commanders may request public affairs personnel augmentation, whether they have public affairs assets or not, to their unit during a specific crisis or contingency. A thorough mission analysis and situational assessment of the anticipated news media coverage will assist the higher unit commander in deciding how to apportion public affairs assets. If public affairs assets are not available and news media are expected, commanders must use members of their staff to perform these duties. News media training and planning assistance should be available from the higher unit PAO even if a public affairs Marine cannot be attached to the unit.

The Public Affairs Officer

Although Marines and their missions make the news, PAOs help get it reported. The primary roles of the PAO are to facilitate the

release of timely, accurate information to the public and to oversee internal information and community relations programs. When directed by the commanders, the PAO is also the chief command spokesperson. To reach the American public, the most expedient conduit is the mass news media: print, radio, TV, and, increasingly, the Internet. In many cases, the mass media is also the fastest and most efficient way to reach the internal audience: Marines, families and dependents, and civilian employees.

A key function of the PAO is educating internal and external audiences. PAOs have to go to great lengths to educate the news media members about the commands and missions they are covering. PAOs must ensure that news gets out, not only quickly but also accurately. Because PAOs cannot write reporters' stories for them, they must educate members of the news media to the point where they can understand for themselves what they are seeing and hearing. Because all Marines are potential spokespeople, Marines need to know where they are, why they are there, what to expect from news media personnel, and what they can talk about. Before and during deployment, the PAO arranges the necessary public affairs orientation and training.

Despite the requirement to satisfy the news media's needs, the PAO works for his commander and for the Marine Corps. The commander needs to be well briefed to know what the story is, how many reporters and news organizations are covering it, what they are saying, and how their stories are affecting the mission, if at all. As part of his briefing, the PAO may want to supply the commander with a handy and useful tool: a series of definitive, one- or two-sentence statements on the pertinent issues. These statements can be put on 3- by 5-inch file cards for quick reference. If they are written well, the statements will become sound bites on TV and radio news. This kind of preparation can prevent

the commander from sounding uninformed or incapable of forming cogent thoughts.

The Public Affairs Staff

PAOs are supported by professional staffs that vary in size. In addition to combat correspondents, news media escorts, and editors, a public affairs office staff will probably include the following key members.

- 1 The deputy PAO—assists in and assumes the responsibilities of the PAO in his absence. Some of the deputy's functions may include coordinating the release of all information concerning adverse incidents; developing and maintaining a program to keep the internal and external publics informed about Marine activities; and assisting in coordinating operational planning.
- 1 A public affairs chief—advises the PAO concerning personnel matters, organizational issues, and news media coordination as appropriate. Other responsibilities may include serving as fund administrator, maintaining financial and supply records, and preparing the public affairs office budget; managing the logistic considerations for press conferences and/or briefings; and providing technical advice and assistance to the PAO concerning all aspects of public affairs initiatives.
- 1 The news media relations officer—has primary responsibility in directing the interaction with news media. Other functions include preparing and distributing news releases to the military and area news media; interacting with JIBs when deployed as the Marine Forces PA; and preparing and distributing electronic news and feature releases to military and civilian news media outlets.

- 1 The PA plans officer and/or SNCO—has primary responsibility for integrating public affairs considerations into the planning process—whether that be for exercises, contingencies or operation plans. Additionally, since most public affairs assets work out of the same office, the plans section provides the necessary interface between that office and the operational units for operational training and support.
- 1 Community relations—a noncommissioned officer (NCO) is normally assigned to assist the PAO in that function. Some of the duties of the community relations NCO are to direct the operations of the section, participate with community groups and serve as the principal asset of the PAO for all matters pertaining to a civilian-military community relations council, maintain a speakers roster that lists base personnel who are able to participate in public speaking engagements, receive and maintain records of noise complaints, respond to community inquiries, and coordinate unit information officer meetings.

COMMANDER'S APPROACH

Dealing with the news media is a two-way street. An honest, straightforward presentation of the facts is the approach that, over time, will best serve the Marine Corps and the Nation. Commanders benefit by seizing the initiative to get out in front of a story, therefore setting the agenda. A timely, candid approach, especially in the case of a potentially negative story, can set a positive tone for everything that follows. Bad news is unavoidable, and it does not get better with age. The best tactic is to present all the facts to the news media. Commanders make effective use of the news media by continuing to employ an honest, open approach to all issues—especially the difficult ones.

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Summary

As the United States moves into the next century, public affairs is becoming more critical to organizational survival. Public affairs operates in an information environment that is characterized by near-instantaneous communications, with 24-hour live news coverage in a security environment involving operations that are diverse, far-flung, and simultaneous. Public affairs must interact with the news media to ensure that the truth is portrayed to the general public; to maintain good community relations; and to keep Marines, civilian employees, retirees, and their families informed. The Marine Corps must confront these monumental tasks head-on.

Competition in the global communications marketplace continues to intensify as technology shrinks the world. The news media, if it is misinformed or lacks credible information sources, can create serious difficulties for an institution. Once an organization is saddled with bad press, overcoming the stigma is extremely difficult. The results can be detrimental to the morale of that organization.

Public affairs is guided by certain principles to ensure that accurate, relevant information is disseminated to the appropriate audiences. Although there is no cookbook solution for successful public affairs operations, these fundamentals provide a standard for success and assist public affairs personnel in the conduct of daily operations. Additionally, because every Marine is a potential spokesperson, these principles permit all Marines to understand and participate in public affairs.

Successful public affairs programs are led by the commander. Public affairs organizations can make a valuable contribution to a unit and the Marine Corps if the commander understands public affairs and supports the PAO. Executed properly, public affairs operations

can garner public support, build unit morale, and leverage the potential of public affairs as a force multiplier.

Ultimately, the PAO bears the responsibility for educating both the commander and the command about public affairs. As a special staff officer working directly for the commander, the PAO must establish a close working relationship with the commander and the staff. The PAO must ensure that public affairs is thoroughly integrated in the organization so that public affairs becomes a forethought instead of an afterthought. This is especially important in the planning mode, whether for a peacetime event or a contingency operation.

Finally, the fact that the public affairs triad has three equal legs must be recognized. Even though most Marines associate public affairs with external information, internal information and community relations are also essential elements of public affairs operations and are vital to the accomplishment of Marine Corps objectives.

Appendix A

Department of Defense National News Media Pool Support

Guidelines for news media pool support on the national level include—

- 1 Frequent, comprehensive, unclassified operational briefings for pool personnel.
- 1 Ongoing combat or exercise operations accessibility. (The personal safety of the news media is not a reason for excluding them. The goal is to treat the news media as noncombatants accompanying forces and allow them to accompany the organizations in the conduct of their missions.)
- 1 Reasonable access to key command and staff personnel.
- 1 An O-5 or O-6 officer from the supported command to coordinate news media pool requirements.
- 1 Itinerary planning that will enable news media pool members to disperse throughout the operational area.
- 1 Not-to-interfere basis of cooperation from all forces participating in the operation or exercise.
- 1 Supported command planning for logistical support for pool and escort personnel from existing contingency or exercise funds. Required support may include, but may not be limited to—
 - n Existing airlift (operation or exercise) from the CONUS to the AO or exercise.

- n Theater ground, sea, and air transportation to allow pool coverage of operations.
- n Reimbursable messing and billeting.
- n Equipment issuance considered appropriate to the situation (e.g. helmets, canteens, flak vests, cold weather clothing).
- n Communications facilities access to file stories on a priority basis. (Where possible, access to long-distance calls through credit cards should be obtained or procedures for billing long-distance calls should be established as appropriate for the given location.)

Appendix B

Guidance

PAG is normally a packet of information or messages to support the public discussion of defense issues and operations. However, such guidance can range from a telephone response to a specific question to a more comprehensive package. It could contain an approved public affairs policy, news statements, and answers to anticipated news media questions. The PAG also addresses the method(s), timing, location, and other details governing the release of information to the public. Commanders should submit their proposed PAG, via the joint chain of command, to DOD for those missions involving joint or combined forces.

A complete description of how to develop a proposed PAG can be found in DOD Instruction (DODINST) 5405.3, *Development of Proposed Public Affairs Guidance (PPAG)*, of 5 April 1991. At a minimum, the PAG should include—

- 1 Classification. Classification ensures that security is maintained. All PAGs should indicate a security classification.
- 1 Approach (active or passive). An active approach involves efforts made to stimulate public or news media interest, such as distributing press releases and inviting the news media to observe AV-8B Harriers. A passive approach is when no action is taken to generate news media and/or public interest in an issue or activity beyond answering specific inquiries. If a passive approach is desired, the PAG should specify that the PAG is for response to a query only.

- 1 Public statement. A public statement explains the issue, event, or exercise. The statement should be for public release in an active public affairs approach or for response to a query in a passive public affairs approach.
- 1 Questions and answers. The PAG should contain a list of proposed and/or approved questions and answers to enable the user to respond to the majority of anticipated questions.
- 1 Contingency statement. If the PAG is proposed for approval, it should contain a contingency statement to be used before releasing the finished PAG.
- 1 Points of contact. The PAG should include the name of the originator of PAG and all points of contact (POCs).

Appendix C

Meeting the News Media

Preparation results in effective discussions with the news media. Central to the process is the effort to identify what information will be released based on prevailing PAG and OPSEC. Commanders, briefers, and public affairs personnel should be aware of the basic facts of any operation and be sensitive to the various consequences of communicating these facts to the public.

Security at the source serves as the basis for ensuring that no information is released that jeopardizes OPSEC or the safety and privacy of joint military forces. Individuals meeting with journalists are responsible for ensuring that no classified or sensitive information is revealed. This guidance also applies to photographers, who should be directed not to take pictures of classified areas or equipment or in any way to compromise sensitive information.

Each operational situation will require a deliberate public affairs assessment to identify specific information to be released. The following categories of information are usually releasable, although individual situations may require modifications.

- 1 Arrival of U.S. units in the commander's area of responsibility (AOR) once officially announced by the DOD or by other commands in accordance with release authority granted by the OASD for Public Affairs. (Information could include mode of travel [e.g., sea or air], date of departure, and home station or port.)
- 1 Equipment figures and approximate friendly force strength.

- | Prisoner of war and friendly casualty figures by Service; approximate figures of enemy personnel detained during each action or operation.
- | Information (nonsensitive, unclassified) regarding U.S. air, ground, sea, space, and special operations (past and present); in general terms, identification and location of military targets and objectives previously attacked and the types of ordnance expended.
- | Date, time, or location of previous conventional military missions and actions as well as mission results.
- | Number of combat air patrol or reconnaissance missions and/or sorties flown in the operational area; generic description of origin of air operations, such as land- or carrier-based.
- | Weather and climate conditions.
- | Allied participation by type (ground units, ships, aircraft), if appropriate.
- | Operations' unclassified code names.
- | Names and hometowns of U.S. military personnel.
- | Names of installations and assigned units.
- | Size of the friendly force participating in an action or operation using general terms such as multi-battalion or naval task force.
- | Types of forces involved (e.g., aircraft, ships, carrier battle groups, tank and infantry units).

Classified aspects of equipment, procedures, and operations must be protected from disclosure. In more general terms, information in the following categories of information should *not* be revealed because of potential jeopardy to future operations, the risk to

human life, possible violation of host nation and/or allied sensitivities, or the possible disclosure of intelligence method and sources. Although these guidelines serve to guide military personnel who talk with the news media, they may also be used as ground rules for news media coverage. The following list is not necessarily complete and should be adapted to each operational situation.

- 1 Specific numerical information on troop strength, aircraft, weapons systems, on-hand equipment, or supplies available for support of combat units for U.S. or allied units; general terms should be used to describe units, equipment and/or supplies.
- 1 Any information that reveals details of future plans, operations, or strikes, including postponed or canceled operations.
- 1 Any information and imagery that would reveal the specific location of military forces or show the level of security at military installations or encampments; for datelines, stories will state that the report originates from general regions unless a specific country has acknowledged its participation.
- 1 Any rules of engagement (i.e., information on intelligence activities, including sources and methods, lists of targets, and battle damage assessments).
- 1 Specific information on friendly force troop movement or size, tactical deployments, and dispositions that would jeopardize OPSEC or lives, including unit designations and names of operations until released by the joint force commander (JFC) during an operation.
- 1 Any identification of mission aircraft points of origin, other than as land- or carrier-based.

- 1 Any information on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of weapons systems and tactics including, but not limited to, enemy camouflage, cover, deception, targeting, direct and indirect fire, intelligence collection, or security measures.
- 1 Specific information for identification of missing or downed aircraft or ships while search and rescue operations are planned or underway.
- 1 Special operations forces' unique methods, equipment, or tactics that, if disclosed, would cause serious harm to the ability of these forces to accomplish their mission.
- 1 Operational or support vulnerabilities information that could be used against U.S. or allied units unless that information no longer provides tactical advantage to the enemy and is released by the joint commander; damage and casualties may be described as light, moderate, or heavy.
- 1 Specific operating methods and tactics (e.g., offensive and defensive tactics or speed and formations); general terms such as low or fast may be used.

NEWS MEDIA RELATIONS TIPS

During an assignment to a MAGTF or other duty, Marines will probably meet members of the news media. It is a good idea to know what to do and how to act. The following are some helpful tips:

- 1 Treat reporters with the same respect and consideration that you expect from them but do not let them intimidate you—you are the expert and should be in control.

- | Treat reporters equally; reports from local news media often appear in the national press and can be as effective as national news media for reaching your audience.
- | Return a reporter's phone call as quickly as possible or have your PAO do so.
- | Be cooperative and empathetic; most reporters are working against a deadline that can make them seem impatient and demanding.
- | Get to know your local reporters before a crisis happens.

INTERVIEWS

The following list describes types of interviews:

- | **Print**—In-person or on the phone; usually more lengthy than a broadcast interview.
- | **Television**—Office, one-on-one interview with a reporter and camera crew; as a rule, it is relaxed and informal.
- | **Panel**—In a studio.
- | **Remote**—The correspondent's subject is onscreen, but taped at another location; can be live from the scene of an incident or accident.
- | **Press conference**—You deliver a statement to and field questions from a group of reporters at a predetermined time and place.
- | **Ambush**—Unexpected and impromptu encounter that usually is disconcerting and face-to-face.

- 1 TV talk show—Host and/or guest may answer audience questions.
- 1 Radio—Live phone, one-on-one conversation; phone interview, not live, and the resulting sound bites are used whole or in part.
- 1 Radio show—Same as television but without cameras; may involve responding to phone calls from the audience.

BEFORE THE INTERVIEW

To prepare for an interview—

- 1 Know the medium that you will be working with—television, radio, or print—and the specific requirements of each.
- 1 Consult with your PAO; have your PAO play the reporter and practice questions with you.
- 1 Be familiar with your reporter; know his or her style and the types of questions usually asked.
- 1 Be aware of any breaking news stories.
- 1 Prepare two or three points that you would like to interject into the interview; use people-oriented examples to illustrate those points and practice working them into your answers.
- 1 Use makeup—it helps to control perspiration and glare, if being interviewed on television.

- | Wear the service “A” or “C” uniform appropriate for the season, if in uniform for studio interviews; do not wear name tags or other I.D. badges, they cause glare and are distracting. The uniform of the day is appropriate for waterfront or scene-of-event interviews.
- | Ensure that the reporter indicates when you are being taped, for radio interviews by phone.

DURING THE INTERVIEW

During an interview—

- | Relax; be yourself.
- | Tell the truth, even if it is painful. You will maintain credibility by doing so.
- | Explain as much as you can if you cannot discuss something (i.e., it is under investigation or classified). If additional information is requested, make an effort to get back to the reporter. Never say “no comment.”
- | Tell the reporter if you do not know the answer to a question. Offer to get back to the reporter later with the answer, if possible.
- | Avoid military or technical jargon. Remember, your audience is the American public.
- | Answer directly and give the bottom line upfront—you can amplify later.

- 1 Correct the record. If a reporter makes an error or has wrong information, make the correction during the interview.
- 1 Listen carefully to the reporter; ask for repetition or clarification, if necessary.
- 1 Maintain eye contact; make sure the reporter knows you are interested and paying attention.
- 1 Be expressive and try to be interesting.
- 1 Be humorous, if appropriate. Humor can be one of the best forms of communication.
- 1 Maintain a positive attitude.
- 1 Talk “on the record” or not at all.
- 1 Be prepared to answer the five “Ws” and the “H”: who, what, where, when, why, and how.
- 1 Assume that you are on the air, even if you are told that you are off; technical crews make mistakes.
- 1 Be modest but confident. You are the expert, but do not be condescending.
- 1 Use the studio monitor to check your appearance before air time, then maintain eye contact with the reporter and ignore the monitor.
- 1 Do not lose your temper—even if provoked.
- 1 Do not drum your fingers, twiddle your thumbs, tap your feet, or act nervous.

- | Do not look around the room for the answer; it gives the impression of discomfort, bluffing, or desperation.
- | Do not speculate or comment on matters beyond your cognizance or responsibility.

AFTER THE INTERVIEW

After the interview—

- | Thank the reporter for the interview and the opportunity to communicate with the American public.
- | Clarify any points that were unclear.
- | Ensure that all information is correct.
- | Bring a copy of the interview transcript to public affairs personnel for critique.

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Appendix D

Sample Public Affairs Estimate

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PUBLIC AFFAIRS OPERATIONS ESTIMATE NO.

(U) REFERENCES: Maps, charts, or other documents, including all current PAG from OASD for Public Affairs

(U) TIME ZONE USED THROUGHOUT THE ESTIMATE:

1. (U) Mission

The command restates its mission from a public affairs perspective.

2. (U) Situation and Considerations

This paragraph describes the strategic and operational media environment in which the operation is being conducted and identifies the critical factors that might affect the command's mission—the action and reaction within global news media channels. It identifies

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the news media environment across the operational continuum, from austere (for low news media interest and capability in a limited AOR communications infrastructure) to dynamic (for high news media interest and capability in a high-tech AOR infrastructure). At a minimum, this paragraph must include the assessments described in the following paragraphs.

- a. (U) Information Environment. This is an assessment of the characteristics of the operation and information environment in the AO. It identifies any activities or issues that affect the overall mission and the command's public affairs objectives.

- b. (U) News Media Presence. This is an assessment of the news media presence in the theater of operations before deployment and the likely presence of additional news media during the conduct of operations. It also includes an assessment of the authority under which the news media is operating and its degree of access to the AO.

- c. (U) News Media Capabilities. This is an assessment of the news media's information collection and communications technology; it specifically identifies the extent of visual information acquisition and satellite communications capabilities. It includes an analysis of logistic support, transportation assets, and the host-nation communications infrastructure available to the news media.

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d. (U) Media Content. This is an assessment of the global news media organizations' presentation of information and their agendas and an analysis and prioritization of the potential strategic and operational issues confronting the command in the news media. This news media content analysis evaluates the quantity of coverage and the nature of that coverage.

e. (U) Public Opinion. This is an assessment of the national and international attitudes about the operation and the command, as well as about the leaders and the soldiers conducting it. This paragraph should include the perceptions held by key audience groups and the relative solidity or strength of those attitudes. A public opinion analysis should include, at a minimum, an analysis of the—

- | American public.
- | Civilian political leaders.
- | Coalition and allied forces.
- | Coalition and allied publics.
- | International audience.
- | Internal command audience.
- | Home-station public.

f. (U) Information Channel Availability. This is an assessment of the information channels available for the communication of information in and out of the AOR. It identifies the means available to the commander for receipt, transmission,

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and dissemination of digital and analog voice, data, text, graphics, and visual images. It describes command, coalition, and local and national facilities and equipment available. This includes an analysis of available telephone lines for voice and data transmission, the accessibility of audio and video channels, the prevalence of private communications devices (e.g., soldier- and civilian-owned cellular telephones, fax machines, computers, portable radios and televisions, and still and video cameras), and the possible nature and flow of the information through these channels.

g. (U) Information Needs. This is an assessment of the information needs of the previously identified key audiences. It analyzes key internal and external audiences and assesses their news and information expectations. It identifies the types of information that will be made available to these key audiences.

h. (U) Personnel Situation. This describes the present dispositions of public affairs personnel and units that affect the public affairs mission as well as the needed and available assets.

i. (U) Public Affairs Situation. This is a summary of current public affairs objectives and the specific COAs for each objective. This paragraph provides a detailed summary of information to high levels of command and has a reference to an annex in the estimate. Subparagraphs will include all current PAG from OASD for Public Affairs.

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j. (U) Assumptions. Assumptions may be needed for initiating planning or preparing the estimate until specific planning guidance from the commander becomes available. These assumptions will be modified as factual data becomes available.

3. (U) Analysis and Comparison of Courses of Action

Analysis of each COA is based on the public affairs objectives in paragraph 2.i. This includes problems and deficiencies and advantages and disadvantages of each COA. At a minimum, subparagraphs should include news media facilitation and support, information strategies, and force training and support.

4. (U) Conclusions

The conclusion should contain the following information:

- 1 The ability to support the command mission (restated in paragraph 1) from the public affairs viewpoint.
- 1 The COA that can be best supported.
- 1 Major public affairs deficiencies that the commander must consider, including specific recommendations concerning the methods of eliminating or reducing the effects of these deficiencies.

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ANNEXES:

- A – Copy Points
- B – Questions and Answers

Copy points are short statements that serve to explain the operation and support core messages, which would be used as often as possible during the course of interviews with core news media personnel. The questions and answers annex, likewise, prepares potential interviewees to respond positively and quickly to questions, both easy and hard, that core news media personnel are likely to ask. Copy points and questions and answers should be developed concurrently with the public affairs estimate and updated and expanded continually throughout the planning process.

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Appendix E

Preparation of Annex F

A public affairs plan is required when preparing for exercises, operations, or routinely planned events. Public affairs planning will be carried out concurrently with operational planning. With minor modifications, the elements used to construct Annex F to the OPORD can also be used by the command to formulate the public affairs plan for garrison use.

Normally, to support Annex F, public affairs assets—both personnel and equipment—must be deployed early. In many situations, news media representatives will be present in the AO before the arrival of military forces. Public affairs personnel who are deployed early can provide maximum support to the commander and the force because they are prepared to interact with news media representatives on the ground.

Under most circumstances, operation-oriented public affairs plans will contain the elements described in the following paragraphs.

Statement of Mission and Goals. The initial statement of a plan should reflect the broad public affairs mission during the particular operation or event, not the overall military mission. Communication goals should be clearly stated in appropriate detail. For a plan that supports combat operations, a determination should be made whether the enemy will mount a propaganda operation; if so, one communication goal must be to thwart this effort with factual, objective coverage.

Assumptions on Which the Plan is Based. Assumptions should be clearly and honestly stated and should include a communication appraisal of the media interest anticipated as a result of the operation or event.

Release Authority Named. The public information release authority will be stated in the plan.

Basic Coordinating Instructions. This section should include all necessary details in direct support of news media relations (such as news media pool procedures), embarkation schedules, any restrictions because of weight or equipment, the plan for aerial support of the news media, the plan for ground support of the news media, story material shipment plans, or other details.

Security Safeguards. The security section should outline security concerns unique to the operation or event and include OPSEC measures in force, essential elements of friendly information, and a general guideline of releasable and nonreleasable information for the duration of the operation.

Combat Documentation. Provisions for military combat documentation shall be included in the plan when visual information teams are involved in the operation. Included in this section are support provisions for combat camera teams, combat correspondents, coverage priorities, and other instructions.

Support Requirements. Support requirements should provide instructions on messing, berthing, communication, equipment, and other means of support for the news media. This section has taken a dramatic turn toward recognizing the unique needs of the news media. Increased support for the news media, within unit limitations, enhances the working relationship between the news media and the Marines and provides a better understanding of the operational requirements of the military unit.

Appendix F

Annex F, Public Affairs

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ANNEX PUBLIC AFFAIRS ANNEX TO OPLAN

(U) REFERENCES: Maps, charts, regulations, and other relevant documents.

(U) TIME ZONE USED THROUGHOUT THE ORDER:

1. (U) Situation

This section includes a brief general description of the situation (i.e., information affecting public affairs support that paragraph 1 of the OPLAN does not cover) and the intended purpose of this annex.

- a. (U) Friendly Forces. Outline the higher headquarters' plan, the public affairs annex, and adjacent unit public affairs plans. Provide information on friendly coalition forces that may affect

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the public affairs mission. Note public affairs resources supporting the unit.

b. (U) Attachments and Detachments. Identify all augmenting public affairs units supporting this command and all attached or assigned subordinate units. Include effective dates, if applicable.

c. (U) Enemy Forces. List information on the threat force, its relationship to the public affairs mission, and any information not included in the OPLAN and/or OPORD that may affect the public affairs mission.

d. (U) Assumptions. List any additional assumptions or information not included in the general situation that will affect the public affairs mission.

2. (U) Mission

This is a clear, concise statement of the public affairs mission.

3. (U) Execution

This section provides a summary of the overall intended COA.

a. (U) Concept of the Operation. Briefly summarize the public affairs OPLAN. Include public affairs priorities.

b. (U) Public Affairs Tasks. Identify and assign supporting public affairs tasks to each element of subordinate and

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supporting units. Assign specific tasks to elements of the command charged with public affairs tasks, such as requirements for public affairs augmentation.

c. (U) Coordinating Instructions. Give details on coordination, task organization, and groupings. List instructions that apply to two or more subordinate elements or units.

4. (U) Service Support

Service support includes statements of administrative and logistical arrangements.

a. (U) Administration. Provide a statement of the administrative arrangements applicable to this operation. If they are lengthy or are not ready for inclusion in the OPLAN, these arrangements may be issued separately and referenced there.

b. (U) Logistics. Provide a statement of the logistical arrangements applicable to this operation. Specific coordination should be included if possible, but arrangements may be issued separately and referenced there, if they are too lengthy.

5. (U) Command and Signal

List signal, visual imaging and satellite communications policies, headquarters and news media center locations or movements, code words, code names, and liaison elements.

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Appendix G

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AFRTS	Armed Forces Radio and Television Service
AO	area of operations
AOR	area of responsibility
C2	command and control
C2W	command and control warfare
CA	civil affairs
CMC	Commandant of the Marine Corps
CMO	civil-military operations
COA	course of action
ComRel	community relations
CONUS	continental United States
CPX	command post exercise
DOD	Department of Defense
EEFI	essential elements of friendly information
EW	electronic warfare
FOIA	Freedom of Information Act
HMMWV	high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle
HQMC	Headquarters Marine Corps
JFC	joint force commander
JIB	Joint Information Bureau
JPOTF	Joint PSYOP Task Force
JTF	joint task force
KIA	killed in action
MAGTF	Marine air-ground task force
MARFORRES	Marine Corps Forces Reserve
MCDP	Marine Corps doctrinal publication
MCPP	Marine Corps Planning Process
MCWP	Marine Corps warfighting publication

MEF..... Marine expeditionary force
MOOTW military operations other than war
MOPP mission-oriented protective posture
NCO..... noncommissioned officer
NGO nongovernmental organization
OASD Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
OLA..... Officer of Legislative Affairs
OMFTS..... operational maneuver from the sea
OPLAN..... operation plan
OPORD operation order
OPSEC.....operations security
PA.....public affairs
PAG public affairs guidance
PAO public affairs officer
POCpoint of contact
PPAG.....proposed public affairs guidance
PSYOP..... psychological operations
PVO private voluntary organization
SECNAVINSTSecretary of the Navy Instruction
SOP.....standing operating procedures
TV..... television
U.S..... United States
USMC.....U.S. Marine Corps

Appendix H

References and Related Publications

Statutory Material

United States Constitution

United States Code Title 10, subtitle C, part I, section 5063 United States Marine Corps: Composition; Functions

United States Code Title 18, section 1913 Lobbying with Appropriated Moneys

Department of Defense Instruction (DODINST)

5405.3 Development of Proposed Public Affairs Guidance (PPAG)

Department of Defense Directive (DODD)

5122.5 Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs

Joint Publication (JP)

3-61 Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations

Secretary of the Navy Instruction (SECNAVINST)

5720.44A Public Affairs Policy and Regulations

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications (MCDPs)

- 1 Warfighting
- 1-1 Strategy
- 1-2 Campaigning

Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM)

- 1-0 Leading Marines

Marine Corps Online Publications

The 31st Commandant's Planning Guidance; available online from <http://www.usmc.mil>

Making Marines and Winning Battles . . . Since 1775; available online from <http://www.usmc.mil>

Concepts & Issues; available online from <http://www.usmc.mil>

Army Field Manuals (FMs)

- 46-1 Public Affairs Operations
- 100-6 Information Operations

Related Publications

America's Team, the Odd Couple, a Report on the Relationship Between the Military and the Media

Notes

1. Major General John A. Lejeune, USMC, *Marine Officer's Guide* (1996) p. 306. Major General Lejeune was the 13th Commandant of the Marine Corps.
2. Frank J. Stech, "Winning CNN Wars," *Parameters* (Autumn 1994) pp. 37-56.
3. Lieutenant General Anthony Zinni, USMC, "It's Not Nice and Neat," *Proceedings*, vol. 121/8/1,110 (August 1995) p. 29.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
5. General C.C. Krulak, USMC, *The 31st Commandant's Planning Guidance* (August 1995) p. A-16.
6. Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America, Article I.
7. General C.C. Krulak, USMC, *The 31st Commandants Planning Guidance* (August 1995) p. A-16.
8. MCDP 1-2, *Campaigning* (August 1997) p. 31.
9. Molly Moore, *A Woman at War* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993) p. 168.